{
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    "title": "Home on Reset Tech Australia",
    "description": "Recent content in Home on Reset Tech Australia",
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        {
            "title": "Likely to be Accessed and the Children's Code",
            "date_published": "2025-08-12T18:43:32-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-08-12T18:43:32-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/likely-to-be-accessed-and-the-children-s-code/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/likely-to-be-accessed-and-the-children-s-code/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThe Children’s Online Privacy Code will establish a set of guidelines to improve children’s privacy and will apply to social media services, relevant electronic services and designated internet services where they are likely to be accessed by children. This briefing paper explores a discussion held by 13 experts from academia and civil society in July 2025 around how the ‘likely to be accessed’ standard might be operationalised in the Code.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt recommends that:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe development of the \u0026rsquo;likely to be accessed standard\u0026rsquo; should take a child rights based approach, and ensure that as much as possible, coverage matches the online services that children and young people use\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAny ‘thresholds’ included would consider children’s rights as a priority and risks to their privacy if not met. Some existing understandings of ‘likely’ might create an expectation of a simple numeric threshold, and therefore not offer appropriate protections for rights\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe understanding of what ‘use by a child’ is should be expanded beyond the obvious situation where a child has actively chosen to use a service. Where a service uses a child’s data, children should also be considered users of a service\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFrameworks for LTBA determinations could draw from the UK’s AADC and Irish Fundamentals, and the evidence standards outlined in these jurisdictions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "5 Necessary Elements for Digital Platform Regulation Updated",
            "date_published": "2025-07-16T12:22:24-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-07-16T12:22:24-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/5-necessary-elements-for-digital-platform-regulation-updated/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/5-necessary-elements-for-digital-platform-regulation-updated/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThis is the second edition of Reset.Tech Australia\u0026rsquo;s policy paper, outlining the big picture changes necessary to transform Australia\u0026rsquo;s digital regulation into systemic focussed legislation. We offer this material to the Albanese Government to support their consideration of Big Tech regulation in the 48th Parliament.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn this update, with support of legal counsel, we further probed some of the likely challenges for a ‘comprehensive’ online safety package in Australia. This edition includes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAnalysis on potential barriers to systems-driven online safety reforms\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eConsideration of the \u003cem\u003eOnline Safety Act Review Report,\u003c/em\u003e which was publicly released after version 1 of this report\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRevised recommendations for policy design, including some reworking of the ‘duty of care’ model, proposing adaptations to address constitutional concerns and refine the drafting.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe released the first edition of this policy guide in late 2024, when Australia had gone through an eventful year with ‘Big Tech’. The stand-off with Meta over the News Media Bargaining Code had interlocked with a public campaign from legacy media that highlighted the social risks from large ‘social media’ platforms. Parents mobilised, and parliamentarians provided them with the solution of age restrictions for accessing social media. The implementation of this package continues across 2025.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAt the time of the ‘ban/delay’ discussions, Reset.Tech Australia was part of a quiet but persistent group who observed that any government seeking long-term safety outcomes from online providers would need to simultaneously oversee a ‘product safety’ style regime to formalise and entrench a broader set of expectations. This included addressing the product design and software that creates adverse outcomes for users – giving rise to well-documented public health issues like device addiction and disrupted sleep, as well as more complex technical issues like vulnerabilities in paid-for advertising models that give rise to financial scams. This update report outlines how digital regulation could address these broader expectations.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Targeted advertising \u0026 the Children's Online Privacy Code",
            "date_published": "2025-06-16T10:15:21-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-06-16T10:15:21-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/targeted-advertising-the-children-s-online-privacy-code/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/targeted-advertising-the-children-s-online-privacy-code/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThe Children’s Online Privacy Code  is widely expected to address a range of privacy issues for children, including targeted advertising. This briefing paper explores a discussion held by 21 experts from academia and civil society in June 2025 around how the Code might address targeted advertising.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt recommends that:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Code addresses the ‘data processes’ involved in targeted advertising. This includes data collection, use, and disclosure, along with other aspects inherent to targeted advertising that cuts across multiple Australian Privacy Principles (APPs).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Code offers a strong remedy, such as prohibiting or presuming against the collection, use or disclosure of data to enable targeted advertising.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStrong requirements for transparency — including regulator transparency and public transparency — be implemented within the Code itself.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe discussion outlined that:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTargeted advertising is a violation of children’s rights because of the data handling process it involves. The Children’s Online Privacy Code would be well placed to prohibit this practice on privacy grounds.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTargeted advertising creates a risk environment for young people and places them in danger of harm. Even if this process is occasionally used to promote positive advertising, this overall risk profile would justify prohibiting the use of children’s data to fuel this practice in the Code.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMultiple jurisdictions have presumed against the practice in comparable children’s data codes. The UK, Ireland and the EU have used data protection laws to create a presumption against targeted advertising by outlining that children should not be profiled. The EU has dovetailed this with a broader prohibition under the \u003cem\u003eDigital Services Act.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA major mismatch exists between how the digital economy currently functions and what Australians deserve and want. Extensive research shows that Australians are uncomfortable with the practices of targeted advertising.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe process of targeted advertising involves a pipeline of data handling practices, including the collection, use and disclosure of data, as well as automated profiling. This means that there are multiple ways a Code could address targeted advertising, and a pipeline-wide approach would be desirable.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThere is a broader need for transparency and accountability within the Code. Without this, non-compliance or malicious-compliance could become commonplace.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUltimately, this is a question of ‘the business model’; can protecting children’s privacy create a way to lift children out of the current rights-violative approach?\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Children's Online Privacy Code",
            "date_published": "2025-04-15T06:10:22-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-04-15T06:10:22-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/children-s-online-privacy-code/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/children-s-online-privacy-code/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eReset.Tech Australia has been organising a range of research and consultation events and activities around the Children\u0026rsquo;s Online Privacy Code.  This page documents the summaries and notes from these.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIncluding:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/copc-survey-of-young-people.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eA poll of 1,624 13-17 year old Australians regarding the Code\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/copc-notes-young-people-full-consultation.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eA workshop with 40 young Australians aged 13-17 regarding the Code\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/copc-notes-young-people-small-consultation.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eA smaller workshop with 4 young Australians aged 13-18 regarding the Code\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/copc-notes-young-people-migrant-backgrounds.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eInterviews with 7 young Australians aged 13-18 from migrant and diaspora backgrounds\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/copc-notes-young-people-out-of-home-care.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eA workshop with 6 young Australians aged 13-17 with experience of out-of-home care settings\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/copc-notes-civil-society-consultation.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eA workshop with 70 academics and policy analysts regarding the Code\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"/uploads/app-childrens-rights-briefing-paper.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003eA briefing note prepared for the academics and policy workshop\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Reasonable steps in digital platform regulation: what is reasonable and to whom?",
            "date_published": "2025-02-16T04:10:57-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-02-16T04:10:57-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/reasonable-steps-in-digital-platform-regulation-what-is-reasonable-and-to-whom/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/reasonable-steps-in-digital-platform-regulation-what-is-reasonable-and-to-whom/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThe concept of ‘reasonable steps’ is embedded throughout Australian digital platform regulation. Yet, despite being a widespread concept in the digital regulatory framework, determining what is or is not a reasonable step is not a clear-cut process. As the 2024 \u003cem\u003eeSafety Commissioner v X Corp\u003c/em\u003e case highlighted, determining reasonableness can be highly contested, with regulators, digital platforms, politicians and the public often not seeing eye-to-eye. However, as discussions about reviewing and strengthening Australia’s OSA and other regulatory frameworks for digital platforms continue, the concept of ‘reasonable steps’ in the online world is likely to be reinforced across the regulatory landscape.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis policy briefing reflects discussions from a roundtable of 17 experts from academia and civil society in January 2025, where we examined the concept of reasonable steps, debating its usefulness and whether and how it could be improved. The event was held under the Chatham House Rule, meaning this briefing presents an overview of the discussion, without attributing specific comments.\u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "The breadth of AI risks across Australia; why we need a considered approach to regulation",
            "date_published": "2025-02-16T04:07:15-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-02-16T04:07:15-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/the-breadth-of-ai-risks-across-australia-why-we-need-a-considered-approach-to-regulation/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/the-breadth-of-ai-risks-across-australia-why-we-need-a-considered-approach-to-regulation/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThis paper is a ‘thought piece’ that offers insights into eight broad areas of concern regarding AI. It is not intended as an anti-AI paper, but rather as a provocation to remind us that as we increasingly adopt AI in our day-to-day lives, there are significant opportunities but also substantial risks. Like all digital risks, these can and should be mitigated with careful regulation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe hope this paper opens up new areas for regulatory thought as AI regulation takes shape. It offers short provocations addressing:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnvironmental risks\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCorporate control of human relationships\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCreative industries\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe information ecosystem\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe rights of women and girls\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUltra-processed healthcare\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAutomated injustice\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDigital dependency\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Transparency Report 2024",
            "date_published": "2025-02-16T03:56:24-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2025-02-16T03:56:24-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/transparency-report-2024/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/transparency-report-2024/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eIt’s customary in the nonprofit game to release a glitzy document bragging about the year’s activities and making big claims about the impact. We did a relatively modest version of this for 2023 and we’re proud of it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2024 was a giant year for tech accountability in Australia, and we’ve really reflected on how we wanted to tell the story of what we did and how we did it. What stuck with us is the ongoing farce of ‘transparency theatre’ when it comes to digital platform providers in this country. The public continues to know very little about the thousands of design decisions digital platforms are making about our online experiences, decisions that have a credible impact on, among others, Australians’ public health and wellbeing – as we heard throughout the debates on the under-16 ban. As we also heard through the ‘kids ban’ policy debate, we are armed with little information about how digital platforms handle public health risks, including unique issues for young people. New products are released and marketed as meaningful improvements, but we lack both the data baseline and the means to look under the hood and assess the impact of digital systems and various technical elements.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSo here’s our transparency report – issued with the objective not to brag or claim credit for policy movements but to comprehensively show our working, and make it clearer to Australians where some of the concepts travelling through tech policy debate have received a bit of our input. Digital platform regulatory issues can be novel and the debate over the right policy settings needs to be prosecuted with clarity and humility. Too often this year, we heard flimsy (and sometimes just wrong!) policy and legal arguments take off in parliamentary corridors. We stand by our arguments and welcome a debate, so we’ve presented it in this document for all to see.\u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Where to for protected digital disclosures in Australia? ",
            "date_published": "2024-12-15T23:26:41-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-12-15T23:26:41-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/where-to-for-protected-digital-disclosures-in-australia/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/where-to-for-protected-digital-disclosures-in-australia/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThis document is a read-out from a closed-door discussion on public accountability and tech whistleblowing. It is presented as a summary of early policy thinking, representing perspectives from tech and accountability advocacy, media, and law. Accordingly, this document is early-stage rather than exhaustive, and will continue to be iterated on.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSpeakers presented on three themes, which were:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhat are the current mechanisms for digital protected disclosures in Australia?\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHow are tech whistleblower disclosures reaching journalists?\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHow are courts using whistleblower evidence in litigation?\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe recommendations provide a template for timely and targeted reforms which will be of interest to state and federal decision-makers.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis briefing can be read as a \u0026lsquo;companion\u0026rsquo; piece to our newly released \u003ca href=\"https://au.reset.tech/uploads/Tech-Whistleblowing-Practical-Guide-241209-WEB.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer nofollow noopener\"\u003e\u0026lsquo;Technology-Related Whistleblowing: A Practical Guide\u0026rsquo;\u003c/a\u003e, co-authored with HRLC and with partnership from Digital Rights Watch and Psst.\u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Welcoming the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024",
            "date_published": "2024-11-28T20:05:27-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-11-28T20:05:27-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/welcoming-the-passage-of-the-privacy-and-other-legislation-amendment-bill-2024/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/welcoming-the-passage-of-the-privacy-and-other-legislation-amendment-bill-2024/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eReset Tech Australia celebrates the passage of the \u003cem\u003ePrivacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis is a vital first step in a long journey towards better privacy protections and data security for Australians.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe especially celebrate the end of ‘co-regulation’ in privacy matters. Industry input has a place, but not in the hot seat holding the drafting pen. More on our work on digital platform regulation and co-regulation in our recent policy briefing: \u003ca href=\"https://au.reset.tech/news/does-digital-co-regulation-function-in-children-s-best-interests/\"\u003ehttps://au.reset.tech/news/does-digital-co-regulation-function-in-children-s-best-interests/\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe are also delighted to see the proposals for Children\u0026rsquo;s Privacy Code move forward. A Privacy Code is vital to ensuring children’s data remains safe and protected in an increasingly data heavy world. Alongside \u003ca href=\"https://www.childrensprivacycode.org.au/\"\u003ea coalition of children\u0026rsquo;s sector organisations\u003c/a\u003e, we have been calling for a privacy code for over two years now. The passage of the Bill represents a big step forward for young people.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe look forward to working constructively with the Government in the much anticipated ‘tranche 2’ stage of privacy reforms, and urge both parties to formalise their ambition on muscular privacy reform as election commitments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "5 Necessary Elements for Digital Platform Regulation",
            "date_published": "2024-11-18T15:51:00-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-11-18T15:51:00-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/5-necessary-elements-for-digital-platform-regulation/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/5-necessary-elements-for-digital-platform-regulation/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThis report draws on previous thinking about the five elements of tech regulation that would be necessary to achieve effective, comprehensive digital regulation in Australia, building on this to include implementation guidelines. As the discussion has advanced, we hope these implementation guidelines add clarity about how to move from slogans to meaningful change.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/uploads/5-Necessary-Elements-for-Effective-Digital-Platform-Regulation.pdf\" class=\"button\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload the report\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Albanese Government has recognised that Australia needs a comprehensive regulatory model that addresses the underlying \u003cem\u003esystems\u003c/em\u003e of digital platforms, rather than continuing to rely on content-based regulatory responses. In November 2024, the Minister for Communications announced an intention to introduce a legislated duty of care, citing a ‘growing global effort’ and an intent to ‘deliver a more systemic and preventative approach to making online services safer and healthier’. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe model the Albanese Government introduces to the Parliament should include \u003cem\u003eall five elements\u003c/em\u003e required for systemic and preventative digital regulation, namely:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eAn overarching duty of care\u003c/u\u003e owed by digital platforms to Australian users;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eRequirements for platforms to assess\u003c/u\u003e all their systems and elements for a defined set of risks;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eRequirements for platforms to implement\u003c/u\u003e reasonable steps to mitigate each risk;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eFive sources of transparency\u003c/u\u003e, including annual risk assessments, prescriptive public transparency reports, independent audits of risk assessments and transparency reports, data portals for ad repositories and content moderation decisions, and researcher access to public interest data; and\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eEnforceable regulations and empowered regulators\u003c/u\u003e to compel behavioural change.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNote that these need to be implemented alongside a reformed and updated \u003cem\u003ePrivacy Act\u003c/em\u003e that protects Australians from predatory digital business practices. The proposals put forward in the \u003cem\u003ePrivacy Act Review Report\u003c/em\u003e are strong and move in the right direction. These are needed to mitigate the personal and national security risks that social media platforms and other digital platforms routinely generate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Welcoming a digital duty of care",
            "date_published": "2024-11-12T23:18:20-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-11-12T23:18:20-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/welcoming-a-digital-duty-of-care/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/welcoming-a-digital-duty-of-care/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWelcoming a digital duty of care\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eReset Tech Australia celebrates the announcement from Minister Rowland that the Albanese Government will develop and legislate a Digital Duty of Care, to place the onus on digital platforms to keep Australians safe and better prevent online harms.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eReset Tech Australia has been advocating for a legislated duty of care for over two years.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA single, overarching duty of care was a key recommendation in our \u003ca href=\"https://au.reset.tech/news/submission-online-safety-act-statutory-review/\"\u003esubmission to the Online Safety Act Review\u003c/a\u003e, our evidence to the Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society, our \u003ca href=\"https://au.reset.tech/uploads/Not-Just-Algorithms-web-230323-V1.0.pdf\"\u003e2023-2024 research on online systems risks\u003c/a\u003e, and \u003ca href=\"https://au.reset.tech/news/briefing-a-duty-of-care/\"\u003ea joint policy briefing\u003c/a\u003e with endorsements from leading children’s, consumer, and human rights voices.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe pay homage to the intellectual work of Professor Lorna Woods and Will Perrin in the U.K., whose development of this concept has paved the way for significant systems change.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA digital duty of care is a legal hook that activates a system of interlocking elements. These include, risk assessment, risk mitigation, public-facing and regulator-direct transparency measures, and accountability measures. The protective and preventative ability of the duty of care will rely on the strength of these four elements.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDr Rys Farthing, Research Director says:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e“This is a tremendously promising step towards a systemic online safety regime. Reset Tech Australia commends the Minister for taking this bold and necessary action. The Minister has overseen an industrious policy work program, and we commend the office for their willingness to absorb and implement best-practice. Implemented properly, a duty of care with diligent risk assessments and pro-active risk mitigation measures could really be a game changer for digital safety”.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e“It is vital that the Government holds the line against the temptation to dilute or break the single duty down into smaller obligations. Australians deserve a broad and overarching duty owed to them from tech companies, as this is the only hook that can take us towards comprehensive user safety”.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We urge the Albanese Government to formalise this vital direction as an election commitment\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Does digital co-regulation function in children’s best interests? ",
            "date_published": "2024-10-29T17:06:36-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-10-29T17:06:36-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/does-digital-co-regulation-function-in-children-s-best-interests/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/does-digital-co-regulation-function-in-children-s-best-interests/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThis policy briefing reflects discussions held at a roundtable of 13 experts from academia and civil society in October 2024, where we explored the specific outcomes of digital co-regulation on Australian children and young people, and queried whether co-regulation can function in their best interests. The event was held under the Chatham House Rule, meaning this briefing presents an overview of the discussion, without attributing comments made.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/uploads/Digital-Co-Regulation-Roundtable-241029-V3.pdf\" class=\"button\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload report\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Open letter about 'social media bans' ",
            "date_published": "2024-10-08T02:59:04-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-10-08T02:59:04-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/open-letter-about-social-media-bans/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/open-letter-about-social-media-bans/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThe Australian Child Rights Taskforce has released an open-letter signed by over 100 Australian academics, 20 world-leading international experts, and 20 Australian civil society organisations regarding the proposals for a social media ban for under 16-year-olds. As the NSW \u0026amp; SA Social Media summits commence, we hope this letter encourages a rethink.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNote: Reset.Tech Australia are hosting this letter online\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/uploads/ACRT-Open-letter-re-social-media-bans.pdf\" class=\"button\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload the letter\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Any Buyer Accepted: Unregulated data markets create personal security risks",
            "date_published": "2024-10-02T04:04:00-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-10-02T04:04:00-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/any-buyer-accepted-unregulated-data-markets-create-personal-security-risks/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/any-buyer-accepted-unregulated-data-markets-create-personal-security-risks/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThe way data is collected and used for most advertising online — called the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) process — sees deeply sensitive data about Australians shown to and shared with unknown parties thousands of times a day. Through RTB, foreign states and nefarious actors can collect massive data hauls on everyday Australians.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSensitive data about Australians is broadcast widely in a free-for-all manner each and every day. The RTB system broadcasts where a person in Australia is 449 times a day to an unknown, and uncontrolled number of companies. One dataset alone — the Australian Eyeota (Dun \u0026amp; Bradstreet) data — shows 17,501 unique data categories being broadcast.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis creates risks of:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eScams: There are no effective controls on who can see or access this data, meaning it is readily available to nefarious actors, such as scammers. This report documents the trading of data about people likely to have used toll booths, which can be used to personalise scam messages about ‘fake road tolls’. It also documents the trading of data about people likely to be expecting a parcel, which can be used to personalise fake ‘Australia Post’ parcel delivery scams, for example.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eForeign interference: Google and other RTB firms send RTB data about Australians to Chinese and Russian firms, where national laws enable security agencies to access the data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe urgently need reforms to the \u003cem\u003ePrivacy Act\u003c/em\u003e to protect Australians from these unnecessary risks, which are beyond the control of individuals to manage. Even if people use secure devices, data will still flow via RTB from personal devices, friends, family, and personal contacts. Stronger data protections to regulate the flow of this information is required.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis report builds on the evidence and analysis from the Irish Council of Civil Liberties (ICCL), who released a compelling report — \u003ca href=\"https://www.iccl.ie/digital-data/australias-hidden-security-crisis/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer nofollow noopener\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eAustralia’s Hidden Security Crisis\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/a\u003e — documenting how the RTB process creates national security risks resulting from the widespread broadcasting of data about Australian military personnel and security staff. The widespread broadcasting of personal data does not stop with our leaders, and ‘kompromat’ is not the only risk. Details about everyday Australians are also broadcast, creating personal security risks such as scams and ID theft. This report builds on the ICCL analysis to focus on personal security risks. We are indebted to the ICCL for their analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eForewords from John Pane at Electronic Frontiers Australia and Chandni Gupta at Consumer Policy Research Centre\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Misinformation and disinformation will not be combatted with industry codes",
            "date_published": "2024-09-11T16:08:04-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-09-11T16:08:04-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/misinformation-and-disinformation-will-not-be-combatted-with-industry-codes/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/misinformation-and-disinformation-will-not-be-combatted-with-industry-codes/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eThis briefing has been prepared in anticipation for the \u003cem\u003eCommunications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024\u003c/em\u003e. \u003cstrong\u003eReset.Tech Australia supports enhanced regulatory powers for misinformation and disinformation, but is deeply concerned the process outlined is captive to an ineffective and hostile ‘industry codes’ process that lets Big Tech off easy and stymies public accountability.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eReset.Tech Australia has undertaken extensive work on testing various large platforms’ policies and responses to misinformation and disinformation in Australia, which this briefing builds on. Our most recent research—\u003ca href=\"https://au.reset.tech/news/report-functioning-or-failing/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eFunctioning or Failing? An evaluation of the efficacy of the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/a\u003e—draws upon experimental research conducted in 2023 that shows severe shortcomings in the outcomes of industry’s Australian Code of Practice on Misinformation and Disinformation (the ‘Code’). \u003cstrong\u003eThat report concludes that the Code is not working, and mechanisms for public accountability are effectively non-existent.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis briefing goes a step further and considers the Code in a legal context. It concludes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0026rsquo;transparency\u0026rsquo; mechanisms under the Code, which require platforms to self-publish \u0026lsquo;Transparency Reports\u0026rsquo; each year, are worryingly poor. \u003cstrong\u003eA Transparency Report may comply with the requirements of the Code while simultaneously breaching misleading and deceptive conduct for the purposes of\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cem\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAustralian Consumer Law.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cbr\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe ‘accountability’ mechanisms under the Code, namely an Independent Review Process and a ‘public’ Complaints Model, are defective:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ei. The Independent Review Process simply cannot incentivise best practice and compliance in reporting, as its scope is confined to publicly verifiable claims. \u003cstrong\u003eThis means platforms’ claims cannot be independently scrutinised. In other words, platforms can freely mislead the public in their reports without the same fact-checking their users are subjected to on their services.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eii. The Complaints Model severely disincentivises public complaints against Code signatories:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThere being no mandated access to platform data about representations contained in Transparency Reports,\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA burden on complainants to satisfy a ‘materially false’ threshold, which arguably imposes a higher threshold of accuracy on complainants than the standard required to be adhered to by signatories when composing Transparency Reports,\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA perilous environment in general for organisations collecting evidence on misinformation and disinformation risks on platforms. Routine social media research techniques can lead to massive platform legal action.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCombined, this represents a hostile environment for public accountability.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur key recommendations for the Bill mirror our 2023 feedback on the Exposure Draft, namely:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eACMA should be immediately empowered to bypass industry codes and set a standard\u003c/strong\u003e. The Bill anticipates as a primary route that the ACMA supervises an industry code making process. Evidence and experience shows this will replicate the mistakes of the past. Put simply, industry has had several years to get the code making right and have failed, despite persistent feedback from both ACMA and civil society. \u003cstrong\u003eThe Bill currently considers regulator standards-setting as a ‘last resort’, but it is evident that the threshold for ‘last resort’ has already been crossed.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn example for a standard could include a \u003cstrong\u003edigital platform public transparency framework\u003c/strong\u003e, as proposed in \u003cem\u003eAchieving Digital Platform Public Transparency\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Bill also envisages future ‘digital platform rules’ to be set by ACMA with parliamentary oversight. It would be prudent for parliament to provide an \u003cstrong\u003eindication of intent\u003c/strong\u003e at the Bill stage, such as a commitment to \u003cem\u003epublic\u003c/em\u003e accountability and \u003cem\u003epublic\u003c/em\u003e transparency, which includes access to platform data to actually permit independent scrutiny. ‘Transparency’ will not be achieved by platforms simply narrating their policies, and ‘risk assessment reports’ need data access in order to be verified.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLegislated protections for accredited researchers and research organisations to platform data\u003c/strong\u003e, in order to tackle the existing public accountability challenges with the industry code, and insulate public interest research from severe risks.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/uploads/Combatting-Misinformation-and-Disinformation-Needs-More-Than-Industry-Drafted-Codes.pdf\" class=\"button\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload the report\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Welcoming a children's privacy code",
            "date_published": "2024-09-10T21:23:24-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-09-10T21:23:24-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/welcoming-a-children-s-privacy-code/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/welcoming-a-children-s-privacy-code/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eReset.Tech Australia welcomes the Government’s introduction of privacy reforms and specifically the commitment to a Children’s Privacy Code.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe successful campaign for a Children’s Privacy Code has been thanks in large part to a committed coalition of organisations who rallied behind a set of key asks (see full list of coalition and asks \u003ca href=\"https://www.childrensprivacycode.org.au/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"\u003ehere\u003c/a\u003e). We are thankful to stand with them.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe look forward to working with the Office of the Information Commissioner as they develop a fit-for-purpose Code that brings modern, vital protections to Australian kids.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe commend the Government for listening to feedback from the children’s sector, who have endured an arduous few years of industry-drafted regulation. Industry drafting has led to inconsistent protections and outcomes. Regulators taking on drafting responsibilities for tech policy is a promising development which we strongly encourage across privacy, online safety, and scams.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eComments attributable to Dr Rys Farthing, Director of Policy \u0026amp; Research at Reset.Tech:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e“We are delighted to see the Government taking necessary steps to better protect kids online, and crucially, build in interventions to consider their best interests. The digital world has been constructed by companies chasing profit, on an insatiable quest for data. This Code is a welcome first step at trying to put the best interests of children ahead of the greed of tech companies”\u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Report: Australians Worried About Privacy Risks, Strongly Support Privacy Reforms",
            "date_published": "2024-08-05T15:39:13-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-08-05T15:39:13-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/report-australians-worried-about-privacy-risks-strongly-support-privacy-reforms/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/report-australians-worried-about-privacy-risks-strongly-support-privacy-reforms/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eReset Tech Australia worked with YouGov in July 2024 to poll over 1500 Australian voters. They were asked a range of questions about digital regulation, in the context of anticipated reforms to the \u003cem\u003ePrivacy Act 1988\u003c/em\u003e. Australians are significantly anxious about a range of privacy and data protection issues, strongly support the direction of travel with the Privacy Act Review, and would like to see reforms carried within a year. A significant number of undecided voters noted they would consider privacy reforms in weighing up who to vote for in the next election.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/uploads/Policy-Briefing-Privacy-Report_240805-WEB.pdf\" class=\"button\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload the report\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Protecting teenagers in the digital world or prohibiting them from it?",
            "date_published": "2024-07-31T18:42:06-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-07-31T18:42:06-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/protecting-teenagers-in-the-digital-world-or-prohibiting-them-from-it/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/protecting-teenagers-in-the-digital-world-or-prohibiting-them-from-it/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eBy Rys Farthing, Director of Policy \u0026amp; Research\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe realisation that something is ‘wrong’ when it comes to young people and social media is now relatively widespread. From detailed research investigating correlations between the \u003ca href=\"https://cyberpsychology.eu/article/view/14052\"\u003efunctionalities\u003c/a\u003e of social media platforms and disorder eating to \u003ca href=\"https://theconversation.com/andrew-tates-extreme-views-about-women-are-infiltrating-australian-schools-we-need-a-zero-tolerance-response-229603\"\u003ediscussions\u003c/a\u003e about the impact of Andrew Tate content on classroom behaviours, the public discourse is awash with conversations about the risks the digital world presents to the young. However, while there is an emerging consensus that there is a ‘problem’ there is significant divergence when it comes to ‘solutions’, including policy solutions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor a few years now, there has been a growing call for \u003ca href=\"https://helda.helsinki.fi/server/api/core/bitstreams/ce499b09-fea8-4e25-a846-3e222f937552/content\"\u003e‘systemic’\u003c/a\u003e policy solutions that make digital platforms responsible for the risks they pose to younger users and how they design and build their systems. This has led to significant policy changes internationally, such as the UK’s \u003ca href=\"https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/childrens-information/childrens-code-guidance-and-resources/introduction-to-the-childrens-code/\"\u003eAge Appropriate Design Code\u003c/a\u003e and the introduction of a duty of care model in the UK’s \u003ca href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/enacted\"\u003eOnline Safety Act\u003c/a\u003e and requirements to risk assess systems underpinning the EU’s \u003ca href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en\"\u003eDigital Services Act.\u003c/a\u003eThere have also been nascent calls in Australia for a systemic approach in \u003ca href=\"https://www.childrensprivacycode.org.au/\"\u003edata privacy for children\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"https://onlinesafetycoalition.org.au/\"\u003eonline safety frameworks\u003c/a\u003e. These sorts of systemic approaches aim to make platforms redesign and reshape themselves so that they are safer and more private for young users in the first instance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, more recently there have been calls to simply ‘ban’ young people from social media or even mobile phone usage until they are older. These calls have predominantly emerged from Republican states in the US, such as \u003ca href=\"https://www.reuters.com/world/us/floridas-desantis-signs-law-restricting-social-media-people-under-16-2024-03-25/#:~:text=The%20measure%20requires%20social%20media,out%20those%20who%20are%20underage.\"\u003eFlorida\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/23/utah-social-media-access-law-minors\"\u003eUtah\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"https://www.independent.co.uk/news/republican-ap-atlanta-georgia-brian-kemp-b2520493.html\"\u003eGeorgia\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"https://www.theverge.com/2023/6/8/23754274/louisiana-child-safety-online-protection-ban-roblox-fortnite-instagram\"\u003eLouisiana\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"https://www.theverge.com/2023/6/14/23760975/texas-ban-social-media-kids-louisiana-utah\"\u003eTexas\u003c/a\u003e where for various political reasons the idea of regulating for safety is unappealing. However, despite being peculiarly American, these policy arguments to ban young people from social media have now travelled across the Pacific and landed in Australian public policy discourse. A number of \u003ca href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/article/2024/may/21/australia-social-media-ban-children-state-government-nsw-qld-sa-vic\"\u003eStates\u003c/a\u003e appear to have adopted this conservative stance and are exploring bans for either social media or smart phones. Backed by \u003ca href=\"https://www.instagram.com/p/C6qYZd8rF4z/?igsh=aHlkbWVyZm9tdHRp\"\u003ecelebrity\u003c/a\u003e campaigns, they appear to be gaining traction at the \u003ca href=\"https://www.themonthly.com.au/podcast/why-did-albanese-back-banning-under-16s-social-media\"\u003eFederal\u003c/a\u003e level as well.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe emergence of ‘bans’ as the policy approach to protecting children online in red states, as opposed to systemic protections emerging in Europe and \u003ca href=\"https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/maryland-passes-age-appropriate-design-code.html\"\u003eDemocratic\u003c/a\u003e states, is not by accident. In a particular brand of American legal thinking, the idea of requiring systemic safety protections for children — such as ensuring an algorithm would not promote suicide content to minors — \u003ca href=\"https://calawyers.org/privacy-law/netchoice-v-bonta-california-age-appropriate-design-code-act-update/\"\u003eviolates the principles of free speech\u003c/a\u003e and has been challenged in the courts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBanning teenagers from the digital world, simple though it may seem, may not be the most productive regulatory response. Young people have the right to go online and they also have the right to be safe online: these are not mutually exclusive rights. As the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child s\u003ca href=\"https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsqIkirKQZLK2M58RF%2F5F0vEG%2BcAAx34gC78FwvnmZXGFUl9nJBDpKR1dfKekJxW2w9nNryRsgArkTJgKelqeZwK9WXzMkZRZd37nLN1bFc2t\"\u003etated\u003c/a\u003e “national policies should be aimed at providing children with the opportunity to benefit from engaging with the digital environment \u003cem\u003eand\u003c/em\u003e ensuring their safe access to it” (emphasis added). In the Australian context, this requires a brave focus on online safety regulations that places a duty of care on tech companies, and requires them to make proactive and preventative changes to their systems and processes to ensure young users safety. Australia’s online safety framework is currently being \u003ca href=\"https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say/statutory-review-online-safety-act-2021#:~:text=The%20Online%20Safety%20Act%202021%20must%20be%20independently%20reviewed%20within,with%20the%20evolving%20online%20environment.\"\u003ereviewed\u003c/a\u003e to deliver just this sort of bold, proactive approach. Banning children seems to run counter to this and serves to limit their ability to access the digital world.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe world is becoming more digital every day, and bans won’t serve Australia well. As the Department for Education simply \u003ca href=\"https://www.education.gov.au/australian-curriculum/national-stem-education-resources-toolkit/introductory-material-what-stem/why-stem-important\"\u003eput\u003c/a\u003e it “the world is changing around us. Digital technology has become a core part of our everyday lives”. Simply banning teenagers from social media, rather than reforming social media sets a worrying precedent. If we set off down a policy path of bans, we may inadvertently create a precedent of narrowing digital opportunities for young people at the exact time where we are talking about expanding digital literacies and growing STEM skills among the young to meet an \u003ca href=\"https://digiworkforce.futureskillsorganisation.com.au/\"\u003eemerging digital skills shortage\u003c/a\u003e. It cannot be ‘beyond the wit’ of Australians to work out how to safeguard our digital architecture for young people. If we want our young people to thrive in the future, we may be better placed developing regulation that protects teenagers in the rich diversity of the digital world rather than regulation that prohibits them from it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBeyond limiting opportunities, prohibitions embed an inappropriate responsibilisation into policy. While the overt responsibilisation that e-safety curriculum often implies has been long \u003ca href=\"https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1\u0026amp;type=pdf\u0026amp;doi=f4a132d94bbd9a276b0dcf4bd73ee98c37a5d2e7\"\u003ecritiqued\u003c/a\u003e, the idea of bans extends this logic of holding young people and parents responsible for online risks. On top of placing responsibility on teenagers and parents to ‘make smart choices online’ or to ‘think before you click’, responsibility would fall on them to ‘stay off’ the technology. Noting that still, no responsibility falls to digital platforms to fix their safety issues in the first instance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCurrently and historically, many commercial products have posed risks to teenagers, from cars to home swimming pools, and rarely have we responded to these technologies with such an individualised focus. As a society, we have always responded to these new technologies by ensuring that they were safe for young people, rather than banning them from it. We implement requirements for seat belts or pool fences, rather than banning teenagers from cars or backyard pools. It is a particular form of \u003ca href=\"https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/07/27/the-era-of-big-tech-exceptionalism-may-be-over\"\u003etech exceptionalism\u003c/a\u003e to believe that managing the risks of digital technologies requires such individualised over-responsibilisation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTech companies should have the same safety obligations as other sectors, and should be required to make themselves safe for teenagers. Banning young people, rather than requiring tech companies to make necessary safety changes, lets tech companies off the hook and doesn’t fix the problem. If we simply ban kids until they are 14, 15 or 16, these products will still be unsafe when young people finally can join. We may keep them out of the frying pan, but they’ll still be jumping into the fire; a better approach would be regulations that tamper down the flames in the first instance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAside from these inherent issues, as decision-makers grapple with this debate, a number of implementation issues probably warrant deeper scrutiny. Specifically;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBans push the problem on to parents, without making platforms safe.\u003c/strong\u003e If we look at how social media bans have been implemented in the US States that have adopted them, largely they are introduced by requiring parental consent for young people to have social media accounts. In this sense, they are less ‘bans’ and more ‘only with your parents say so’ restrictions. But parental consent does not fix unsafe products. For many reasons (lack of knowledge, lack of energy to fight with their child about yet another issue, personal circumstances), some parents will consent and leave their teenagers accessing unsafe products. But for parents who do resist, this simply escalates a whole world of intra-family conflict. I doubt there are many parents of teenagers who aren’t \u003cem\u003ealready\u003c/em\u003e having an ongoing or regular debate with their kids about how much, or which, technologies they are able to use – often leading to \u003ca href=\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563220303654\"\u003econflict\u003c/a\u003e. Introducing additional consent requirements for social media just pushes more pressure onto parents. Besides causing an extra bunch of fighting and upset, it still doesn\u0026rsquo;t actually fix anything.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDefining what we are banning young people from isn’t simple\u003c/strong\u003e. It seems easy to say ‘ban kids from social media’, but when it comes down to it we need to be mindful of what we are banning young people from. Are we banning young people from social media as defined by functionality, such as digital products that enable you to create a public account, post content or send individual or group chats? If so, we might be taking them off of YouTube which is now a go to for all sorts of life tutorials, Roblox where they learn coding or iMessage where they stay in touch with family. Or are we blocking them by company and preventing them using products created by ‘social media companies’, like Meta and Alphabet? If so, we need to think about other services run by these parent companies like GoogleMaps and Whatsapp. While we may be clear in our minds what we want to block teenagers from, the deep vertical integration of the digital world means translating this into law isn’t always easy. Australia’s \u003ca href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021A00076\"\u003eOnline Safety Act\u003c/a\u003e has a range of industry classifications including social media services, but also relevant electronic services, designated internet services, hosting services and internet service providers, internet carriage services…. The lines between them are not always clear and will continue to blur as digital functionalities evolve and vertical integration continues.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eImplementing a ban without a focus on systems is impossible, as the technology to check ages and parental consent is not yet fully functional\u003c/strong\u003e. There is no simple way for a digital service to check a user’s age—known as ‘age assurance’—and even less effective ways for services to check for accuracy in parental consent. Issues with age assurance are currently plaguing attempts to restrict children’s access to pornography, and a \u003ca href=\"https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-19/age-verification-internet-use-children-online-pornography/103843886\"\u003e$6.5m trial\u003c/a\u003e taking place to see if we can get it right in Australia. However, the technology needed to prove someone is over 18 and can access pornography is not the same as the technology needed to prove you’re over 14 or 16, because 14 and 16 year olds largely do not have the same types of ID and ‘biometric’ technologies like facial scanning current have \u003ca href=\"https://www.yoti.com/wp-content/uploads/Yoti-Age-Estimation-White-Paper-May-2022.pdf\"\u003eerror bands\u003c/a\u003eof around 1.5 years – which is a lot for a 14 year old. An EU wide \u003ca href=\"https://euconsent.eu/project-deliverables/#\"\u003einvestigation\u003c/a\u003e into parental consent technologies demonstrated similar difficulties regarding parental consent. These challenges do not mean we cannot or should not try, but again, we’re talking about improving systems and functionality for age assurance. A focus on systems is still needed, and it seems peculiar to insist on improvements to age assurance systems rather than improvements to safety systems.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt comes down to what Australian decision makers see the problem as, and how they want to address it. Is the problem that billion dollar companies are creating unsafe digital products, or is the problem that some of the people who use them are teenagers?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Submission: Online Safety Act Statutory Review",
            "date_published": "2024-07-15T16:17:00-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-07-15T16:17:00-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/submission-online-safety-act-statutory-review/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/submission-online-safety-act-statutory-review/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOverall,\u003c/strong\u003e Reset Tech Australia warmly welcomes the \u003ca href=\"https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/department/media/publications/statutory-review-online-safety-act-2021-issues-paper\"\u003ereview\u003c/a\u003e of the OSA, including:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe comprehensive nature of the review\u003c/em\u003e, and the commitment to ensuring an effective, future proofed regulatory framework.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe breadth of the review\u003c/em\u003e, including references to enhancing accountability including through a duty of care; the introduction of the children’s best interests requirement; the space to draw on international models of best practice; and the intent to investigate effective enforcement. These are necessary, important topics, and appear to indicate a movement towards a systemic approach to managing digital risks rather than addressing specific online harms.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBackground –\u003c/strong\u003e Australia proudly has ‘early-mover’ status on online safety, from its online safety commissioner model, realised through the \u003cem\u003eEnhancing Online Safety for Children\u003c/em\u003e Act \u003cem\u003e2015,\u003c/em\u003e the forerunner to the OSA. Our online safety framework revolves around mandatory notice and take down remedies, delivered through the complaints and content-based removal notices schemes. While these remedies are key for certain categories of harms, they are palliative in nature, operating downstream from risks.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePalliative to Preventative –\u003c/strong\u003e Online harms scholarship has progressed greatly in the intervening years and a key outcome is a realisation that digital platforms could and should do more, \u003cem\u003epreventatively and at a systemic level\u003c/em\u003e, to reduce harm to users. There are gestures towards systemic protections in the OSA, via the Basic Online Safety Expectations (BOSE). The Issues Paper also signals an intent for a more systemic approach. However, the desire for a systemic model comes up against some tensions. They are:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cem\u003eA systemic model cannot neatly rest on a bedrock of 3C/4C harms typologies.\u003c/em\u003e 3C and 4C typologies (content, conduct, contact, contract) foreground risks that are not systemic in nature, so we recommend using them with caution. The most effective digital regulations have emerged where the focus has remained on the systemic risks that platforms create, and therefore platforms can straightforwardly mitigate against.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cem\u003eDrafters should be wary of relying on defined content types and conduct risks\u003c/em\u003e. This sets up protracted battles with platforms over what’s in and out of scope. It also ensures that the OSA is effectively out-of-date the moment it is published (because digital risks are inherently dynamic and move at pace), and; will create a list of disjointed obligations with all sorts of contested definitional issues. The preferred and future-proofed alternative is to work back from an enforceable obligation upon platforms to identify and manage risks.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5 Building Blocks for Online Safety –\u003c/strong\u003e We are calling for a \u003cem\u003esystemic and comprehensive\u003c/em\u003e model, comprising five key ‘building blocks’:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eAn overarching \u003c/u\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cu\u003eduty\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cu\u003e of care\u003c/u\u003e (\u003ca href=\"https://thepolicymaker.jmi.org.au/the-dangers-of-pluralisation-a-singular-duty-of-care-in-the-online-safety-act-2/\"\u003ein the singular, not the plural\u003c/a\u003e);\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eRequirements for risk assessments\u003c/u\u003e, which include requirements to address specific risks, including but not limited to: content risks and broader societal risks;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eRequirements for risk mitigations\u003c/u\u003e, where platforms must identify the mitigation measures they are going to take. Regulators must have the power to review and investigate mitigations measures and compel platforms to improve them where they are deemed inadequate;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eRequirements for meaningful public transparency\u003c/u\u003e (such as public facing risk assessment summaries, transparency reports, independent audits, public repositories of data and researcher access), alongside \u003cu\u003estrong investigatory powers for regulators\u003c/u\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cu\u003eRequirements for strong enforcement\u003c/u\u003e, including resources for regulators, meaningful fining powers and the ability to ‘turn off’ services as a last resort.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/uploads/Reset.Tech-AU-OSA-Review-Submission.pdf\" class=\"button\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload our submission\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n"
        },
        {
            "title": "Achieving Digital Platform Public Transparency in Australia",
            "date_published": "2024-06-23T22:11:25-10:00",
            "date_modified": "2024-06-23T22:11:25-10:00",
            "id": "http://au.reset.tech/news/achieving-digital-platform-public-transparency-in-australia/",
            "url": "http://au.reset.tech/news/achieving-digital-platform-public-transparency-in-australia/",
            "content_html": "\u003cp\u003eAs the momentum to regulate digital platforms in Australia intensifies, two words continue to circulate: transparency and accountability. These are vital and inseparable elements in a digital platforms regulatory model. One application of transparency into practice is a public reporting framework.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTransparency reporting can be a powerful tool for corporate accountability. To fully realise this potential, transparency reporting cannot be left as an opt-in exercise of broad, general and un-assessable statements. This report explores the limitations of Australia’s current public transparency framework for digital platforms and draws on international examples to recommend a path forward.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis report provides a thorough review of the public transparency frameworks under the \u003cem\u003eDigital Services Act\u003c/em\u003e (DSA) and the UK’s new \u003cem\u003eOnline Safety Act\u003c/em\u003e, augmented by recent polling which indicates the public’s broad support for meaningful transparency measures. A model with five specific measures could improve public transparency in Australia is presented.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese include:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Risk assessments\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Annual transparency reports (with prescribed metrics)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Annual independent audits\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4. Data portals, including ad repositories and content moderation databases\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5. Researcher access requirements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese measures could be applied in both online safety and misinformation and disinformation frameworks to create transparency around a broad range of digital risks.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"/Digital-platform-public-transparency.pdf\" class=\"button\"\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__drop\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003cspan class=\"button__label\"\u003eDownload the report\u003c/span\u003e\n\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\n"
        }
        ]
}